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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
of the wife or husband of the intestate . . . :' The court sustained the de-
murrer, held the will void, and that the deceased's property by the above statute
descended to the kindred of only the last of the two deceased husbands of intes-
tate. Russell et al. v. Nelson et al., 295, S. W. 118 (Mo. 1927).
It was the general rule at common law that the death of one spouse terminated
all privileges and obligations peculiar to the marital relationship. Booker v.
Small, 147 Ga. 566, 94 S. E. 999; Piper v. May, 51 Ind. 283. The statute in the
instant case in abrogation of the common law rule permits the descent of
property to the surviving heirs of a deceased spouse under certain circum-
stances.
If the meaning of a statute is doubtful then recourse may be had by the courts
to considerations of public policy. Jersey City Gas Light Co. v. Consumers Gas
Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 427, 2 At. 922; Opinion of Justices, 7 Mass. 523; to considera-
tions of reasonableness and disastrous consequences, Meredith v. United States,
13 Pet. 486, 10 U. S. (L. Ed.) 258; Pickering v. Ray, 3 Houst. (Del.) 479.
When necessary to give effect to legislative intent, words importing the singular
number only, will be construed to include the plural of persons and things.
People v. Aurora, 84 Ill. 157; Ellis v. Whitlock, 10 Mo. 78.
Had the Missouri Court in the instant case pluralized the words "husband and
wife" it would have covered the case of the existence of more than one surviv-
ing spouse by an intestate, a fact opposed to public policy. In the light of
precedented authority it appears that the Missouri Court was justified in its in-
terpretation of the instant statute. J. R. B., '28.
FoRGERY-UsE OF ONE'S OWN NAME WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD.-Action on a
forgery bond. Plaintiffs alleged that they were defrauded by act of depositor
in giving check on other bank wherein he had a small account in an assumed
name, said assumed name or alias being signed to check. Held, defendant liable
because act of depositor amounted to forgery. International Union Bank v.
National Surety Co., 157 N. E. 269 (N. Y. 1927).
The ultimate question is whether or not one can commit forgery by the use
of his own name with intent to defraud. The case under discussion is amply
fortified by prior New York decisions, wherein it seems to be the settled rule
that forgery may be committed even though the accused used his own name.
The New York doctrine seems to be approved generally only where the maker
intended to personate, or incur a pecuniary liability against, someone else bear-
ing the same name. Edwards v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 50, 108 S. W. 673. In the
absence of intent to impersonate another of the same name, the trend of de-
cisions seems to lie that the crime of forgery has not been consummated, and
the crime, if any, is obtaining money under false pretenses. State v. Wheeler,
20 Ore. 192, 25 Pac. 394; Heavy v. Bank, 27 Utah 222, 75 Pac. 727; Murphy v.
State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 488, 93 S. W. 543. The present case was, in reality, de-
cided on what were held to be common law principles because the New York
statute appears to be a mere codification of the common law in this respect.
More stress seems to have been placed on the intent than on the act, in fact it
appears that the intent was all conclusive.
An early English case held it not forgery for a person to sign an instrument,
the subject of forgery, in his own name, although it be of a false affirmation,
unless the name written was used in such a way as to place the burden of the
obligation upon another person bearing the same name. Reg. v. White, 2 C. &
K. 404, 61 E. C. L. 404. This seems to be the general doctrine throughout the
United States. Harrison v. State, 72 Ark. 117, 78 S. W. 763; Barron v. State,
77 S. E. 214 (Ga. 1913); Harris v. State, 98 So. 316 (Ala. 1923). The above
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seems, to. the writer, to be the more logical common law interpretation of the
rule. Obtaining money under false pretenses is, in all of our jurisdictions, a
complete and distinct offense; the policy of some of our courts in construing
such an offense to be forgery appears to be a usurpation of authority by the
courts and an undue infringement on the law-making body of the state.
W. G. S., '28.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PREsENTATION OF NoncE AS CONDITION PRECEDENT
TO REcovERY.-Plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger for hire in a
bus owned and operated by a municipal corporation. Charter provided that no
action for personal injuries could be maintained against the city unless notice
was given in writing to the city clerk within fifteen days of the occurrence of
the injury. Plaintiff failed to file such notice. Held, that charter provision ap-
plies only when the municipality is charged by law with some corporate duty,
and is exercising functions of that character when the injury occurs, and does
not apply when it is engaged in an ordinary private business for hire. Borski
v. City of Wakefield, 215 N. W. 19, (Mich. 1927).
Notice of claim is not a prerequisite in the absence of a statutory provision.
Globe v. Rabogliatti, 24 Ariz. 392, 210 Pac. 685, 19 R. C. L. 1040, and cases there
cited. The language of such provisions must always be noted carefully, for they
differ widely in the various states and hence a number of cases are decided
solely on the particular language of the statute. Provisions requiring notice
are in derogation of the common law, and should be construed with reasonable
strictness. Cawthom v. Houston, 231 S. W. 701 (Tex.); San Antonio v. Pfeif-
fer, 216 S. W. 207 (Tex. Civ. App.) ; Tattan v. Detroit, 128 Mich. 650, 87 N. W.
894.
Where the statute makes no exception in favor of persons physically or men-
tally incapable of giving notice during the statutory period, the weight of au-
thority holds that the court cannot supply it. Ransom v. South Bend, 76 Wash.
396, 136 Pac. 365; Touhey v. Decatur, 175 Ind. 98, 93 N. E. 540, 32 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 350; Schmidt v. Fremont, 70 Neb. 577, 97 N. W. 830. A contrary rule
is followed in Born v. Spokane, 27 Wash. 719, 68 Pac. 386, and Webster v.
Beaver Dam, 84 Fed. 280, on the ground that the law does not seek to compel
a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. In general, infancy does
not excuse failure to comply with the statutory requirement. Baker v. Mani-
tou, 277 Fed. 232; Dechant v. Hays, 112 Kans. 729, 212 Pac. 682; Hurley v.
Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 Pac. 213. It has been held that the requirement of
notice was not intended to apply to the relations between a municipal corpora-
tion and its employees, when the latter are injured by reason of a failure of
the former to provide a safe place to work. Gaughan v. St. Paul, 119 Minn.
63, 137 N. W. 199; Giuricevic v. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 329, 106 Pac. 908. The rea-
son given is that it must be presumed that the city had notice of the injury of
its servant. A contrary result is reached in Condon v. Chicago, 249 Ill. 596, 94
N. E. 976. It is well established that actual knowledge by the municipality
does not excuse failure to present notice. See for example, Reid v. Kansas
City, 195 Mo. App. 457, 192 S. W. 1047; Touhey v. Decatur, supra. It is gen-
erally held that want of notice may not be waived by municipal authorities.
Touhey v. Decatur, supra; Dechant v. Hays, supra; Walters v. Ottawa, 240 Ill.
259, 88 N. E. 651, and cases therein cited. In Cawthom v. Houston, supra, it
was held that the city may waive the charter requirement or may be estopped by
the conduct of its officers from requiring a strict compliance when the city is
acting in a private as contradistinguished from a governmental capacity.
In the principal case, the statute did not make any distinction between govern-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss1/11
